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Abstract
We take a closer look at how investment horizon affects risk taking, often referred to as the time-diversification controversy. We use data on individuals' choices in the Swedish pension system. Theoretically, if returns are serially uncorrelated, investors do not have human capital, and investors have constant relative risk aversion then investment horizon should not influence asset allocation. This theory causes some academics to explain the positive correlation between investment horizon and risk exposure by generational differences in human capital, not the investment horizon per se. Our empirical analysis shows that portfolio risk significantly declines with age in a statistical context. This behavior is still evident after controlling for alternative explanations related to human capital and difficult to reject in an economic context.
I. Introduction
A major asset allocation decision is the amount of risk one is willing to tolerate. Different investors will naturally be more or less risk averse depending on their economic and demographic situation. A commonly observed practice, encouraged by financial planers, is that ones risk should be related to ones investment horizon.
Expected utility theory states that if returns are serially uncorrelated and investors have both constant relative risk aversion and no human capital, then time is not a factor in portfolio allocation. Economists as P. Samuelson (1963 Samuelson ( , 1989 Samuelson ( , 1994 , Bodie, Merton and W. Samuelson (1992) , and Kritzman (1994) offer intuitive examples and convincing formal arguments showing that time-diversification is in fact not diversification at all. They show that an investor who prefers a certain level of risk with, say, a three-month horizon will prefer that same level of risk with, say, a 10-year investment horizon. In fact, Bodie (1995) even labels the belief in time diversification a fallacy. These researchers suggest that the reason risk exposure decreases with horizon in some studies has to do with the investors' demographic or economic situation and is not an attempt to diversify.
On the other hand, if returns are serially correlated or if investors do not have constant relative risk aversion, a decrease in investment horizon can very well lead to decreased risk. Lee (1990) , Siegel (1994) , Thorley (1995) and Campbell and Viceira (2002) explore this. Thorley (1995) shows that the academic view does not necessarily contradict the practitioner view if Samuleson's proof is correctly understood. In essence, Thorley rephrased Samuleson's statement; if investors are expected utility maximizers who do not have constant relative risk aversion, then the optimal proportion of their portfolio allocated to risky stocks is influenced by the investment horizon. In particular, if investors have decreasing relative risk aversion, then investors will optimally decrease their exposure to risky stocks as their investment horizon decreases. Campbell and Viceira show empirical evidence of asset prices being mean reverting over the past 100 years and argue therefore that risks can appear different to long-term investors than to short term investors. Because of mean reversion in prices, stocks may hold a lower risk for long term investors than for short term investors. This is regardless of the investors relative risk aversion. In other words, academics can prove or disprove time diversification depending on whether they assume decreasing or constant relevant risk aversion or if prices are mean reverting or not. Thus, the time-diversification controversy is an empirical issue.
In this study we investigate how a great number of investors have chosen to allocate a portion of their pension. We do not take the prospective stance of Samuelson or Bodie-investors should have constant relevant risk aversion; consequently time does not diversify risk.
Rather, we take a normative stance and observe actual portfolio choices. The first round of choices made in the Swedish pension system had many characteristics of a laboratory experiment. By fiat, the entire work force, those with short and long investment horizons, in the Swedish population constructed portfolios using an equal proportion of their wage. The portfolios were for retirement purposes so the investment horizon is known. All investors were provided with the same information at the same time. We couple this individual portfolio choice data with an extensive database of individual demographic and economic variables in an attempt to explain the time-diversification phenomenon.
Our results show that younger investors have higher risk than older investors, or investors with long horizons have higher risk than investors with short horizons. Our attempts in controlling for differences in human capital do not change this. We also find it difficult to reject this finding in an economic context.
In the following sections we will first review theory concerning time-diversification. In section III we present our data and describe the Swedish pension system focusing on the defined contribution portion and discuss our methodology. Section IV presents our results and we will offer our concluding remarks in Section V.
II. Theory
The basic idea of time-diversification is that above-average returns tend to offset belowaverage returns over long horizons. Formally, if returns are lognormal and independent over time then the average return will increase linearly with time while the standard deviation will increase by the square root of time. Consequently, the risk of getting a lower return than the risk free rate, alternatively, the risk of loosing money, approaches zero as time moves towards infinity. The other side of this argument is that although the risk of losing money may decrease with time, the amount that can be lost increases proportionally thus canceling out any increase in utility that a longer horizon can offer.
In table 1 we review five possible explanations why horizon could affect risk, three against time diversification and two in favor of time diversification.
Arguments against Time Diversification
While critics agree that the ratio of expected return to standard deviation (reward-to-risk ratio) increases with time, they also point out that the size of an investor's potential loss increases in the same proportion as the expected returns, thus reducing the attractiveness of the higher reward-to-risk ratio. Although one is less likely to lose money over a long horizon than over a short horizon, the magnitude of the potential loss increases with the duration of the investment horizon. Kritzman makes a comparison with cross-sectional diversification. If an investor is unwilling to invest $10,000 in a risky project based on his level of risk aversion, then that same investor would not agree to invest in ten independent but equally risky projects which require $10,000 each. Although the investors' risk of losing money is reduced when investing in the ten independent projects, the exposure and, therefore, the amount the investor risks losing is ten times as great. The only way to reduce risk while keeping the exposure constant is if the investor instead is able to invest $1,000 in each of the independent projects. Kritzman further explains that whether an investor has a utility function equal to the logarithm of wealth, or if an individual is even more risk averse and has a utility function equal to negative one divided by wealth, the utility of the risky venture will remain unchanged over time, meaning that an increase in time horizon will not affect an investors tolerance towards risk (see Kritzman 1994 for details). The critics of time diversification are well aware of the studies that show that as investors grow older or as the investment horizon decreases, investors tend to carry lower risk in their portfolios. However, the critics claim that the observed relationship between risk and horizon is not driven by time diversification. We will briefly review three of these alternative explanations.
Non tradable assets (i.e. human capital) may have an impact on the risk of an investor's portfolio. The prediction of utility theory assuming constant relative risk aversion is that the fraction of equities in proportion to true total wealth is unchanged over time. True total wealth is defined as human capital plus liquid capital. Samuelson (1994) illustrates the confounding effect of human capital with a young professional with future non-security earnings. Since the human capital prospects can not be capitalized or borrowed on, to keep the portion of equities at a proper fraction of true total wealth, the young professional should keep a relatively large fraction of his liquid wealth in equities. Later in life, as human capital is converged into liquid capital, the fractional holding of equities appears to decrease when compared to liquid capital, whereas, in fact, the fraction has remained unchanged when compared to true total wealth. Developing this argument further, Bodie, Merton and W. Samuelson (1992) propose that an investor with the ability to work a little harder or postpone consumption is more likely to take a higher risk whereas an older professional does not have the same option.
Another aspect of human capital expressed by Strangeland and Turtle (1999) concerns ones ability to work in times of poor risky-asset returns. We call this the covariance between ones earnings and market performance. If two investors with the same investment horizon differ in covariance, then the investor with a higher covariance is expected to have a lower portfolio risk. The reason being that, if covariance is high, earning power is reduced in times of poor market performance resulting in a major shortfall. A longer investment horizon allows for more of these extreme shortfalls. A "high covariance" investor is more cautious of taking risky investments. If this is true, then investment horizons effect on risk is related to the covariance of ones earning power with market performance.
The third factor in table 1 concerns the frequency of required withdrawals from ones portfolio. Samuelson (1989) suggests that this can explain why risk may decrease as horizon decreases. If an investor requires a minimum amount at a future date i.e. for future pension payments, the investor makes a series of low risk investments to meet this requirement. As the future date approaches, the low risk fund increases in size compared to high risk investments. Such an investment strategy creates the illusion that the investor believes in time diversification. The opposite is true if periodic withdrawals are needed for everyday consumption i.e. if the investor is a pensioner and the investment horizon goes from 65 years of age to death. Then the low risk fund will shrink in size gradually compared to the risky investments as time goes by which may give the appearance of an investment strategy which is opposite to time diversification.
Arguments in support of Time Diversification
Researchers who criticize the notion of time-diversification all assume that returns are Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) and that investors have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), meaning that they will allocate the same proportion of their wealth towards risky assets regardless of their absolute level of wealth. Several techniques are used in estimating the nature of investors' relative risk aversion. The various techniques lead to conflicting conclusions. J. Pratt (1964) and K. Arrow (1965) formalize measures of risk aversion and suggest that investors generally have an increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). K. Arrow referred to IRRA's ability to explain observed economic behavior with respect to holding cash (see Selden 1956 , Friedman 1959 , Latane 1963 and Meltzer 1963 .
The measurement of relative risk aversion has shown to be sensitive to what measure of wealth is used. Research since the mid 1960's have shown evidence of increasing- (Siegel and Hoban 1982 , Eisenhauer and Halek 1999 ), constant-(Szpiro 1986 ) and decreasingrelative risk aversion (Levy 1994) . Thus, an assumption that investors have a constant relative risk aversion is by no means a given. Thorley (1995) shows mathematically that given an expected utility setting and that investors have a decreasing relative risk aversion towards what they perceive to be serially uncorrelated returns, time is in fact a factor in investment decisions and that the allocation towards risk should increase with an increase in investment horizon.
There is a great deal of research on exploring how mean reverting prices affect risk with respect to investment horizon. Campbell and Viceira (2002) find that prices over the past 100 years are mean reverting and therefore time diversifies risk. According to Campbell and Viceira, because of mean reversion, there is a degree of predictability in stock prices.
Measured over long horizons the risk in stock returns is lower than when measured over shorter horizons. Bull markets tend to follow bear markets. Short term investors will seek assets with higher mean reversion, namely bonds, while investors with longer investment horizons accept assets that are less mean reverting since over time the long term risk is lower than the short term risk. This is suggested to be true regardless of an investors relative risk aversion. Hansson and Persson (2000) also conclude that optimal weights using US data from 1990-1997 suggest that time diversification exists and that allocation decision seems to be independent of the utility function of the investor.
The idea of mean reverting prices is not uncontested. Brown, William and Ross (1995) argue that if an equity market survives, average returns in the beginning of a time period is higher than average return near the end of that time period. For this reason, statistical measures of long-term dependence are typically biased towards rejection of a random walk. On another note, ex post evidence of mean reversion does not guarantee mean reverting prices in the future.
III. Data and Methodology
Data
Our data comes from the first round of investment choices made in the new Swedish pension system, introduced in the fall of 2000, coupled with a number of surveys on demographic and economic variables.
Early research on investment behavior was based on experimental data where participants made investment decisions based on hypothetical situations with no financial consequences.
Recently, researchers have studied individuals' actual investment decisions in 401(k) plans.
One drawback of exclusively using data from 401(k) plans is that the population is more or less homogenous. A second drawback is the difficulty in linking reliable demographic data to the actual individuals making the investment decisions in the 401(k) plans.
Our data set has five advantages. First, our data is a representative sample of an entire country's population. Second, all investment decisions were made during the same brief time period. Third, all investors choose from the same investment universe and were given the same information on that investment universe. The information includes a risk measure on most funds which provides us with reasonable proxies for perceived risk.
2 Table 2 is an illustration of what information is provided for all funds in the Swedish pension system. Fourth, we know the approximate investment horizon for each investor since the investment can be used for retirement purposes only and can not be passed on to a third party. Fund, which is an equity fund run by the government. We treat the default alternative as an entirely passive choice. Even if an individual considered the default fund to be the optimal choice, and acted accordingly, he/she still shows up as making a passive choice in the data set 5 .
Dependent variable, Portfolio risk
Five risk measures with varying degrees of sophistication are associated with each investor.
First, we use proportion of equity in ones portfolio. The available funds are divided into four groups: equity-, mixed-, generation-and bond funds. For mixed-and generation funds, information concerning equity proportion is generally available. If no information is available for one particular fund we assign it the equity proportion of its peer funds in the same subgroup 6 in the brochure.
Second, all funds with three years of history or more are assigned a risk category from Third and fourth, next to the risk category illustration there is a number representing the annual standard deviation calculated using returns for the past 36 months. We use this number to construct two risk measures: the weighted average standard deviation of the funds in a portfolio with and without considering the covariance between these funds. Although the covariance between funds is not included in the general information given to all investors there is no stopping them in gathering this information on their own. Also, we can not rule out the possibility that investors have a certain feeling for correlation between sectors. We therefore use both measures in our tests. All funds do not have 36 months of history, wherefore we extrapolate a risk measure for these funds by assigning it the average 36 month standard deviation of the funds in its subgroup.
Independent variables
5 For a detailed analysis over default investors see Engström and Westerberg 2003 6 The brochure assigns each fund to a subgroup consisting of funds with similar allocation objectives (i.e., Swedish growth stocks or European value stocks)
Our primary focus is to investigate to what extent investment horizon affects asset allocation with regards to risk. The investment horizon in this particular investment is 65 minus the investors age since this investment is for retirement purposes only and can not be passed on to any third party. In our model we will use the logarithm of investment horizon, since the difference between 5 and 4 years left to retirement represents a 20 percent reduction in time;
whereas, the difference between 35 and 34 years is only a 2.5 percent reduction in time left to retirement. In theory, investment horizon should not affect ones risk. We list five factors that explain why investment horizon appears to affect risk that we mentioned in the previous section and listed in table 1.
First, Samuelson states that one must control for total wealth, meaning liquid wealth + human capital. Financial wealth is included as an explanatory variable. We use the logarithm of net-wealth assuming a concave utility function. Net wealth is made up of four components: market value of low risk assets plus market value of risky assets plus market value of real estate less debt. The survey used to calculate this particular data (HEK 2000) includes foreign as well as domestic assets and debt. The market value of real estate is estimated using tax and comparable sales data. The market value of a house is estimated as the tax assessment value times the ratio of market price to assessed value using data from recent sales prices of houses in the same area. In Sweden, condominiums are not assessed for taxation purposes. The market value of condominiums is estimated as the average value of the recently sold condominiums in the immediate area. According to Samuelson, net wealth or, liquid capital as he calls it, is only one part of total wealth. The other part is human capital. Human Capital can be defined as a discounted present value of expected disposable income (see Halek and Eisenhauer 1999 , Poterba et al 2003 and Cocco and Gomes 2005 . 
When estimating the present value of future disposable income the discount factor used ( i r )
should correspond to the probability of receiving this future income. We address this challenge by estimating human capital separately for different occupation groups, assuming that the appropriate discount factor is fairly similar for individuals within the same occupational cohort. For example, we estimate expected disposable income for all employees in the public sector. Once we have these estimates we calculate the present value for each individual. If we compare individuals with approximately the same occupational risk, the size of the discount factor will be similar size for all individuals within the same occupational cohort. We use the same discount factor as Halek and Eisenhauer 1999, namely 2% and calculate the present value of disposable income separately for all four occupational cohorts.
Because of this, our results from the different cohorts are not comparable, but they serve as robustness checks to verify whether the coefficient signs and levels of significance tell the same story. We also estimate human capital using the same discount factor for the whole population regardless of occupation. Consequently we have five series of estimates of human capital, one for each occupational cohort and one for the entire sample. Albeit a noisy measure, we still argue that it captures the essential portion of human capital. Bodie's argument is that one can work more if investments go bad. A risky investment gone poorly can be compensated by working harder or consuming less over the remaining investment horizon. A longer investment horizon will then allow higher risk. Since human capital is related to age we expect a high level of multicollinearity in our model. We therefore orthogonalize the horizon variable with human capital by using the error term from the regression:
thus using the portion of investment horizon which is not explained by our human capital related variable.
Second, we consider the covariance between expected disposable income and market performance. It is argued that horizons influence on risk will differ depending on the covariance between an investors earning power and market performance. We use our four occupational cohorts mentioned earlier as dummies. We thereby assume that the disposable income for a government employed has a lower covariance with the market than one who is employed in the private sector or is self employed. Consequently, a government employed may find reason to take more risk in this particular investment than employees in the other occupational cohorts. In the four equations where the occupational cohorts are estimated separately, this particular aspect is taken into account by construction.
Third, Samuelson raises the issue of how frequent withdrawals need to be made from the investor's portfolio. The basis for his argument is that the present value of a minimum level of required wealth at retirement is invested in a risk less fund and that this investment will become an increasing portion in ones portfolio. Consequently, the risk less portion of pension savings resembles a time diversification strategy. Therefore, we need to focus on pension savings in excess of the portion required for minimum wealth at retirement to see if horizon affects risk. The investments observed in our dataset are in excess of the portion required for minimum wealth at retirement and is therefore suitable to use in this context. So, by default this aspect is taken into consideration by the nature of this data.
Fourth and fifth, we are faced with two other factors in explaining horizons effect on risk: the investors' relative risk aversion and whether returns are IID or not. Based on classic economics we assume that investors believe returns are random walk and have constant relative risk aversion.
The Menu
Investors' choices are affected by how the alternatives are presented (Benartzi and Thaler 2001) . Each investor is given a brochure including information on all investment alternatives. Table 2 is a representation of how the funds are presented to the investor. In total 464 funds are available 7 . The funds are divided into four major categories; Equity, mixed, generation and bond funds. We add all aspects of how the investment alternatives are presented in an attempt to control for the effect they may have on risk.
Portfolio optimization primarily concerns risk and return. We therefore control for historical return reported in the brochure with regards to the well documented momentum effect. We also control for the number of years of historical return reported in the brochure and whether the fund is new. We include two normalized variables from 0 -1 to control for the order in which the funds are presented. The funds are divided into subgroups representing region or industry and then placed in an alphabetical order in each subgroup. A fund in the first subgroup in the brochure and starting with the letter "A" will consequently receive values close to 0. In the fund information in the brochure the investor gets information concerning the portion of domestic/foreign assets in the fund. Since home bias is a known issue in asset allocation we control for this aspect. Market cap and fee are also presumed to impact investors' choice and are therefore included in the regression. Since our intention is to measure the time-diversification phenomenon, we need to control for a category of funds called "generation funds". Generation funds are similar to the suggested "pre-set mix" fund in the U.S. The investors that have chosen generation funds could be seen as time-diversifiers by default if they choose the "correct" fund for their investment horizon. Since we are provided with the details of all investment choices we can control for those who have chosen generation funds, whether they have chosen a "correct" mix with regards to their investment horizon or not.
Method
The purpose of this paper is to test whether we can empirically discard the practice of time diversification. For this purpose we use a unique database consisting of a heterogeneous population making investment choices for future pension in a close to laboratory setting. The data we have provides information on the risk level of a specific investment bearing economic consequence and the corresponding horizon of this investment, namely time to 7 455 funds were included in the original brochure. Before the first choice was completed some were added and some were taken away resulting in a total of 464 funds.
retirement. Because our sample suffers from selection bias, in the sense that one third of our sample ended up investing in the default fund with unknown risk, we estimate our parameters with the two step Heckman procedure where first the likelihood of investing is estimated from a probit model. The method may be described by the following two equations:
Equation (4) the pension system will not accurately represent the underlying population.
Heckman suggests the following method to deal with this selection problem. Note that the conditional mean of i 1  can be written as:
and hence ) ( ) 1 , (
Thus, the regression equation on the selected sample depends on 
In (8) 
where  and  are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal distribution and 2
 is the standard deviation of i 2  .
Heckman shows how to estimate (8) in a two step procedure. The first step involves estimating the parameters in (5) by the probit method, using the entire sample. These estimates can then be used to compute i  for each individual in the sample. factors: human capital, flexibility in human capital, covariance between earning power and market performance and the frequency of required withdrawals from ones portfolio.
We run heckman estimations for each occupational cohort and one for the entire sample where we include dummies for occupation. We do this for five different risk measures which in total provide us with 25 estimates for the horizon coefficient.
IV. Empirical Results
Estimating expected disposable income
We estimate the present value of expected disposable income in accordance with equation
(1). Disposable income is explained by age, age^2, education level and major, gender, marital status and number of children. In table 3 we report the coefficients and t-statistics used in estimating expected disposable income. A higher education level than high school (edl3), occupation in the private sector (occ2) and being married (or cohabitant) are the only parameters with significantly non-zero coefficients for all groups. All parameters are used when calculating expected disposable income. For each individual, all variables are held constant except age. A string of expected disposable income from current age to retirement is discounted to a present value in accordance with equation (2), using a constant discount factor of 2%, which is a proxy for the inflation adjusted risk free rate. As we discussed earlier, the discount factor should vary in accordance with the risk of ones occupation. We address this issue by estimating the present value of expected disposable income separately for each occupational cohort. By doing this, we assume the same occupational risk for all individuals within the same cohort. We expect the earning power of those within the private sector to have a higher covariance with market performance than of those in the public sector.
Therefore we let the occupational cohorts in themselves act as proxies for covariance between market performance and earning power. Summary statistics of all variables including our human capital proxies are reported in table 4.
All risk measures are continuous variables which makes them suitable to be estimated by the Heckman method. We note that the demand for equity is fairly high, 90.3% equity on average. The high proportion of equity is reflected in the average portfolio standard deviation of ca: 18%. Investment horizons in the dataset span from 3 years to 46 years with an average of 21.97 years. These numbers reflect time to retirement and capture a representative sample of the working force in Sweden. Compounded three year return is 143%, which is exceptionally high in comparison with historical figures. This high figure reflects an unusually positive development for equity markets. This among other factors may explain the comparatively high rate of participation in the pension system (only one third default investors) and the demand for equity.
According to our human capital estimations, human capital is lower for individuals in the public sector than for individuals in the private sector. Also, the standard deviation for the human capital estimates is larger for individuals in the private sector than those in the public sector. We find these results to be reasonable.
Approximately 61% of the population has previous experience with risky assets, meaning equity or equity funds. This variable and the amount invested in the pension system have proven to be of importance in explaining pension system participation (see Karlsson &
Nordén 2004 and Engström & Westerberg 2003).
Human capital is per definition correlated with age wherefore we orthogonalize the horizon variable so it reflects the portion of horizon not explained by human capital. From the regressions in table 5 we observe large values for adjusted r-squares as expected. There is however still a portion of horizon which is not explained by our proxies related to human capital. The error term is used as our horizon variable when estimating horizons affect on risk. For robustness we use four different risk measures as the dependent variable and redo our estimations five times, one for each occupational cohort and one for the entire population.
Since we are primarily interested in the horizon coefficient we report only them in table 6 while the full results can be found in the appendix.
In table 6 we see that for the first three risk measures, proportion of equity, risk category and simple average standard deviation all coefficients are significantly non-zero at all conventional levels of significance. These three risk measures could be considered to be less sophisticated but they are directly observable in the information given to each investor. When we look at the fourth risk measure, portfolio standard deviation including the covariance, we see that only two of the five coefficients are significantly non-zero at 5% significance level namely, coefficients for the whole sample and for those employed in the private sector.
In table 7 we calculate the expected risk for a typical investor in our sample given our estimated coefficients where all values are held constant according to sample averages and investment horizon takes the value 5 or 40. To be able to interpret the results we do not use horizon orthogonalized to human capital as in all other equations. Using the unorthogonalized horizon ( ln(65-age)) will cause the individual coefficients to be biased due to multi co linearity but our point estimates for risk will still be unbiased.
The difference in risk caused by a 35 year difference in investment horizon, all else held equal, is reported under "difference" in table 7. For the first three risk measures horizon appears to be important even in an economic context. However, regarding standard deviation when covariance is included, the difference in risk, caused this 35 year difference in investment horizon, is only one percentage point for the entire population and for those employed in the private sector and undistinguishable from zero for the other three cohorts.
For this risk measure, investment horizon seems to have no significant impact.
V. Conclusion
Previous research offers compelling arguments for and against time diversification.
Arguments against time diversification are that if returns are IID, investors have no human capital and have constant relative risk aversion then, investment horizon should not affect risk. Arguments related to human capital in some way or another are used to explain why many studies show a positive relationship between risk and investment horizon. These arguments stress that it may be rational to increase risk as investment horizon increases but time in and of itself does not decrease risk. Arguments for time diversification attack the assumptions of IID returns and constant relative risk aversion. If investors have a decreasing relative risk aversion or of asset prices are mean reverting, then it may be optimal to let risk be affected by ones investment horizon.
We attempt to control for three of the explanations offered by economists as to how this behavior can be justified; Investors' human capital, the covariance between their earning power and the market and the frequency of required withdrawals. In accordance with classic finance literature we assume that returns are IID and our investors utility display constant relative risk aversion.
Our results give an overall indication that investment horizon affects risk even after our attempts to control for the three factors mentioned earlier and controlling for how the investments are presented.
However, regarding portfolio standard deviation, the risk measure with the highest degree of sophistication, the horizon coefficients are undistinguishable from zero in three cases out of five and very small in the other cases. It is not clear however, how aware non-professional investors are of the covariance between funds. For the other three risk measures; proportion of equity, average risk category and average standard deviation (not including covariance), all indicate that investment horizon matters. Whether this is due to mean reverting prices, investors having decreasing relative risk aversion or the mere fact that much of the advice in media propagates strategies resembling time diversification, we can not say.
Our proxies for human capital receive coefficient signs in accordance with theory whereas the covariance of ones earning power with market fluctuations, i.e. our occupation dummies, have either coefficients that are indistinguishable from zero or coefficients so small, they have very little economic significance. A full account of all coefficients is found in the appendix.
In summary, our results are somewhat confounding. One the one hand, when referring to less sophisticated risk measures, the horizon coefficient is significantly positive and seems to be important in an economic context. On the other hand, when referring to a more sophisticated risk measure which includes the covariance between funds, information which isn't available in the brochure, then the horizon coefficient is indistinguishable from zero in three cases out of five and doesn't seem to be of great importance in an economic context. The percentage return for the last five years equals the compounded annual growth rate of return for the years 1995 through 1999. The total risk corresponds to an annualised percentage standard deviation of three-year monthly historical fund returns. The total risk is also categorised into five different classes, and colours, with respect to standard deviation; Class 1: very low risk, dark green, percentage standard deviation in the range 0-2; Class 2: low risk, light green, 3-7; Class 3: average risk, yellow, 8-17; Class 4: high risk, orange, 18-24; Class 5: very high risk, red, 25-. Age and age^2 relate to the individuals age 31 Dec 2000. Edl1 = less than high school education, edl2 (default) = high school education, edl3 = more than high school education. Edm1 (default) = social science major, edm2 = technical engineer major, edm3 = major in medicine and edm4 = unknown major. Occ1 (default) = employed in public sector, occ2 = employed in private sector, occ3 = self employed and occ4 = sector unknown. Gender 1 = man, 0 = woman. Married or cohabitant = 1, single = 0. Children, refers to number of children. N.obs is the number of observation in the entire sample and in each occupational cohort. Mean disp = the average disposable income for the entire sample and each occupational cohort. Prob>F = the probability that all coefficients are collectively indistinguishable from zero. Adj. R-sq = the adjusted R-square of the regressions. The t-statistics are reported under each coefficient in italics. Full sample = 15 651 observations, sub-sample including only those who made an active portfolio choice = 10 375 observations. When estimating human capital for the four occupational cohorts we only use individuals in that cohort.
Risk measures include four variables; amount invested in equity / total invested amount (equity), the average risk category according to the information in the brochure (risk category), weighted average standard deviation without considering covariance (std (no cov)) and portfolio standard deviation including the covariance (std). Primary variable of interest is investment horizon = 65-age. In the heckman regression, we use the log of investment horizon orthogonalized with regards to human capital in accordance with equation (3) Control variables include compounded three year return, our estimates for human capital and net wealth which is financial wealth + real estate -debt. Selection variables for probit estimation in heckman model include a dummy variable for previous experience with risky assets, meaning equity or equity funds. 61 % of the population was exposed to risky assets prior to this investment decision. Amount invested represents the kronor amount invested in this particular investment. Menu variables 10 variables from the brochure are included in all regressions. Full results reported in appendix tables A1-A5. Coefficients in parenthesis are not significantly separate from zero on a 5% level.
The results in table 6 we report the coefficients for portion of investment horizon not explained by human capital. As a robustness check we run the regressions using five separate risk measures; number of funds, amount invested in equity / total invested amount (equity), the average risk category according to the information in the brochure (risk cat), weighted average standard deviation without considering covariance (std (no cov)) and portfolio standard deviation including the covariance (std). The Heckman regression is estimated separately for each occupational cohort and once for the entire population. Occ 1 represents employees in the public sector, occ2 represent employees in the private sector, occ3 represent self employed and occ4 are of unknown employment. The t-statistics are reported under each coefficient in italics. 
In table 7 we report estimated values of our risk measures; amount invested in equity / total invested amount (equity), the average risk category according to the information in the brochure (risk cat), weighted average standard deviation without considering covariance (std (no cov)) and portfolio standard deviation including the covariance (std), when the investment horizon is 40 and 5 years, all other variables held equal. We also report the differences in actual values (difference) and the differences as percentage changes (percentage difference). The values in parenthesis are calculated with horizon coefficients that are not distinguishable from zero on a 5% level. The differences are therefore not distinguishable from zero either.
Appendix, variable explanation for tables A1-A4 found after -13,7 -9,76 -9,48 1,29 -3,91 correct -2,27E-02 -3,43E-02 -1,55E-02 -1,01E-01 -3, 62E-03 -6,69 -5,72 -3,57 -5,49 -0,26 shorter -1,07E-01 -1,01E-01 -8,96E-02 -2,34E-01 -1, 57E-01 -17,66 -10,01 -11,18 -9,3 -5,22 longer -3,32E-02 -9,78E-03 -4,41E-02 -6,93E-02 -2, 53E-02 -4,23 -0,66 -4,51 -1,77 -0,79 market cap 3,64E-07 5,50E-07 2,88E-07 -1,53E-08 6,97E-07 years of history -3,37E-02 -3,70E-02 -2,86E-02 -4,39E-02 -4, 29E-02 -14,61 -8,4 -9,82 -4,39 -4,94 new -1,18E-01 -1,34E-01 -9,61E-02 -1,61E-01 -1, 31E-01 -13,37 -7,84 -8,73 -4,34 -3,87 subgroup -1,39E-01 -1,62E-01 -1,21E-01 -3,66E-02 -2, 05E-01 -20,41 -12,93 -13,67 -1,12 -8,43 alphabet -6,76E-02 -4,01E-02 -7,36E-02 -7,13E-02 -9, 23E-02 -10,91 -3,41 -9,44 -2,27 -4 10,87 25,09 -4,29 -14,27 _cons -1,61E-01 -8,67E-01 -7,43E-01 -1, 49E+00 -6,46E-01 -6,46 -24,96 -25,32 -26,59 -15,16 -21,73 -11,75 -15,9 -7,29 -6,37 shorter -4,15E-01 -3,75E-01 -3,92E-01 -7,67E-01 -4,04E-01 -25,22 -13,94 -18,02 -9,84 -4,81 -23,99 -13,93 -17,28 -4,48 -7,59 new -4,81E-01 -4,85E-01 -4,29E-01 -4,95E-01 -6, 45E-01 -20,12 -10,69 -14,37 -4,29 -6,82 -6,46 -24,96 -25,32 -26,59 -15,16 -25,07 -14,16 -18,07 -8,66 -6,85 shorter -4,82E-02 -4,49E-02 -4, 46E-02 -8,34E-02 -6,01E-02 -32,41 -18,89 -22,63 -10,84 -8,09 longer -1,74E-02 -1,32E-02 -1,78E-02 -4,57E-02 -2, 00E-02 -9,04 -3,81 -7,39 -3,82 -2,54 market cap 1,46E-07 1,99E-07 1,47E-07 -3,80E-08 6,03E-08 years of history -1,65E-02 -1,65E-02 -1,56E-02 -1,87E-02 -1, 88E-02 -29,13 -15,93 -21,82 -6,09 -8,79 new -5,49E-02 -5,60E-02 -4,96E-02 -6,35E-02 -6, 89E-02 -25,41 -13,93 -18,33 -5,59 -8,21 subgroup -3,83E-03 -7,81E-03 -2,72E-03 3,93E-02 -1, 12E-02 -2,29 -2,66 -1,25 3,92 -1,88 alphabet -1,81E-02 -1,02E-02 -1,70E-02 -2,23E-02 -3, 82E-02 -11,91 -3,68 -8,85 -2,32 -6,76 10,87 25,09 -4,29 -14,27 _cons -1,61E-01 -8,67E-01 -7,43E-01 -1, 49E+00 -6,46E-01 -6,46 -24,96 -25,32 -26,59 -15,16 A4, standard deviation all occ1 occ2 occ3 occ4 horizon 0,0057011 0,0030275 0,0049222 0,0107706 0,0074723 proportion of domestic funds -1,58E-02 -1,48E-02 -1,23E-02 -1,40E-02 -1, 61E-02 -9,46 -6,21 -5,66 -1,04 -2,66 correct -4,62E-03 -3,85E-03 -3,16E-03 -3,25E-02 -3, 48E-03 -5,34 -3,21 -2,88 -3,9 -0,97 shorter -1,26E-02 -9,91E-03 -1,13E-02 -4,20E-02 -1, 03E-02 -8,17 -4,89 -5,59 -3,71 -1,3 years of history -4,61E-03 -4,94E-03 -3,98E-03 -2,83E-03 -6, 46E-03 -7,82 -5,6 -5,41 -0,63 -2,83 new -5,95E-03 -9,25E-03 -3,50E-03 1,85E-02 -1, 54E-02 -2,64 -2,7 -1,26 1,11 -1,73 subgroup -1,57E-02 -2,11E-02 -1,29E-02 3,04E-02 -2, 67E-02 -9,01 -8,43 -5,76 2,06 -4,19 alphabet -2,76E-02 -1,43E-02 -2,64E-02 -6,62E-02 -4, 67E-02 -17,46 -6,08 -13,37 -4,68 -7,77 10,87 25,09 -4,29 -14,27 _cons -1,61E-01 -8,67E-01 -7,43E-01 -1,49E+00 -6,46E-01 -6,46E+00 -2,50E+01 -2,53E+01 -2,66E+01 -1,52E+01 Tables A1-A4 report return is the historical average three year return of the portfolio. Human capital is the present value of expected disposable income. Log of net wealth is the logarithm of net wealth (market value of financial assets + market value of real estate -debt). Employed in public sector is the default whereas employed in private sector, self employed and employment sector unknown are the other occupational dummies. Proportion of domestic funds is the % amount of the portfolio which is invested in domestic assets. Correct, shorter and longer are dummies which refer to generation funds. For example, if an investor with ten years to retirement invests in a generation fund labeled "ten years to retirement", correct = 1. Market cap is a chosen fund's market capitalization in SEK * the portfolio weight of that fund. Fee is the weighted average of the fees of the funds in the portfolio. Years of history represents the weighted average amount of years of the funds in the chosen portfolio. New = 1 if the fund has no history. Subgroup and alphabet deal with the order in which the funds are presented. In each asset class (equity-, mixed-, generation-and bond funds) there are subgroups (e.g. medical funds, European funds etc). The order of the subgroups and the alphabetical order within the subgroups are quantified into a number between 0 and 1. The two variables in the first step probit equation, listed under choice are; previous experience with risky assets and amount invested in this particular investment.
